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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF BALLOT
INITIATIVES: THE CHANGING ROLE OF
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
CraigB. Holman, Ph.D.* and Robert Stem**
Centerfor Governmental Studies
The history of governance in the United States is one of a conflict between democratic rule and the protection of civil liberties.
This conflict is perhaps most visible in the tension between the legislative process and the judicial system. While legislation is often the
product of democratic majority will, the judicial system is generally
designed to be a step removed from democratic majoritiesfrequently in the form of unelected and unaccountable judgeships.2
Americans select their judges through a wide array of methods,
ranging from appointive selection procedures to democratic elections. Federal judges, for example, are appointed by the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate.3 States, on the other hand,
are free to devise their own selection procedures with relatively few
constraints imposed by federal statutory or constitutional law.4 In all
cases, the selection procedures chosen reflect a preference between
Craig B. Holman, Ph.D., is Project Director of the Center for Governmental Studies, a non-profit research organization, and Executive Director of
Californians for Political Reform Foundation, a public interest organization
committed to the defense and implementation of Proposition 208, California's
campaign finance initiative approved by voters in November 1996.
** Robert M. Stem is Co-Director and General Counsel of the Center for
Governmental Studies. Mr. Stem also regularly serves as a lecturer on elections
at the University of California at Los Angeles and has co-authored several works
on the initiative process and campaign finance. He was General Counsel for the
California Fair Political Practices Commission from 1975-1983.
1. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and not those
of the Center for Governmental Studies.
2. See Barry Friedman, Dialogueand JudicialReview, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577,
588 (1993).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4. One scholar attributes this state independence in judicial selection to the
history of the King of England controlling the pre-Declaration of Independence
judges. See Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciaries
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CM. L. REV. 689,714-25 (1995).
*
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judicial autonomy versus public accountability-or some balance in
between."
Direct democracy in California has found itself in the middle of
this unresolved conflict between democratic governance and the judicial protection of civil liberties. Californians make extensive use6 of
the initiative process, the most democratic and purely majoritarian
form of policymaking.7 Thus, it should come as no surprise that public policies formulated through the initiative process often become
embroiled in controversy and scrutinized by the courts.
California courts, however, are not of one mind when it comes to
initiatives. Part of the reason behind the courts' diverging views on
judicial scrutiny of initiatives is that, depending on the level of court,
judges are selected through three very different methods.8 Trial court
5. The conflict between judicial autonomy and public accountability in defining judicial systems arose in colonial America. See Bridget E. Montgomery &
Christopher C. Conner, PartisanElections: The Albatross of Pennsylvania'sAppellate Judiciary, 98 DICK. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993). In the early 1700s, judges x%re
deemed "crown agents" who were appointed and served at the pleasure 4 the
King. See Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning Up JudicialElec.,uns:
Examining the FirstAmendment Limitationson Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2
MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 71, 73 (1997). At that point the judiciary was neither independent of political authorities nor accountable to the public. See id. at 74.
The Declaration of Independence decried this archaic system of justice for having "made judges dependent on his [the King's] Will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries." Id. at 73-74, (quoting
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776)). America's founders
decided to remedy this situation by providing that judges be appointed for life
and subject to removal from office only by impeachment. Eight of the original
thirteen states bestowed the power to select judges upon one or both houses of
the state legislature; New Hampshire and Pennsylvania made appointment process a joint responsibility of the governor and the legislature; Maryland, Massachusetts and New York gave the appointive authority to the governor, subject to
confirmation by the legislature. See Levien &Fatka, supra.
In the country's first years, the lack of popular election of judges at either
the federal or state level was due to the Founders' belief that the judiciary
needed to be independent of oftentimes emotive political and public whims. See
id. That attitude eventually faded in the first half of the nineteenth century with
the onslaught of the Jacksonian "revolution" against the unaccountability of government institutions. See id. The egalitarian philosophy engendered by Andrew
Jackson led to the democratization of most state judiciaries. See id. In 1832
Mississippi became the first state to make all judgeships elected positions, and by
the outbreak of the Civil War, twenty-four of thirty-four states elected their
judges. See id.
6. See infraPart III.
7. See Kara Christenson, Note, Interpreting the Purposes of Initiatives:
Proposition65, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1035-36 (1989) (describing the initiative
process and contrasting it with legislative alternatives).
8. The method of judicial selection affects the way a judge or justice ap-
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judges in California are selected in competitive elections; appellate

justices in the state are selected through non-competitive retention
elections;0 and federal judges are selected by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate for lifetime appointment."
These differences in the system of judicial selection at the state
and federal courts have a significant impact on California's judicial
review of initiatives.
I.

CHALLENGING AN INITIATIVE IN COURT CAN BE DONE
THROUGH A WIDE VARIETY OF MEANS

Initiatives can be challenged in court through a multiplicity of
ways. They can be challenged early to keep them off the ballot or
later after voter approval.

They can be challenged in state courts or

in the federal courts, or both. 3 Court challenges to initiatives may
follow a routine time schedule or an expedited schedule if the courts
feel pressing issues must be resolved immediately. 4 And opponents
of a voter-approved initiative may request a preliminary injunction to
suspend the initiative legislation until after a full trial.15 In short,

proaches a potentially politically charged initiative issue. See infra Part V.

9. See Robert C. Luskin et al., How minority judges fare in retention elections, 77 JUDICATURE 316,318 (1994).

10. See id.
11. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Carl Tobias, Choosing
FederalJudges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
741, 741 (1997).
12. See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & M. Thomas Jacobson, Growth Control By the
Ballot Box: California'sExperience, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1073, 1094 (1991).
13. Compare Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir.

1997) (challenging California's Proposition 209 in federal court), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 397 (1997), with Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of

Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 218, 583 P.2d 1281, 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 241
(1978) (challenging California's Proposition 13 in state court); see also California
Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No. CIV. S-96-1965LKKDAD,
1998 WL 7173, at *1-*4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998) (debating whether state or fed-

eral court is the more appropriate forum to analyze California's Proposition 208).

14. Compare Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 812-14,771 P.2d
1247, 1249-50, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163-64 (1989) (noting that it took only two days
for the California Supreme Court to act after the enactment of California's
Proposition 103, staying the initiative), with Bates v. Jones, 958 F. Supp. 1446,
1453-55 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that it took six years for California's Proposition 140 to be properly considered on the merits), affd, 127 F.3d 839 (9th Cir.
1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 679 (1998).

15. See, e.g., Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1491

(N.D. Cal. 1996) (granting preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of
Proposition 209 pending trial), rev'd, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), stay denied,
118 S. Ct. 17 (1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
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initiatives can be challenged in court in virtually all the ways that any
legislation can be legally contested.
Nevertheless, some patterns of challenging an initiative in court
are relatively common. In most states, such as California, the courts
are rarely willing to remove an initiative from the ballot prior to an
election.1" For example, the California Supreme Court displayed judicial restraint in refusing to decide the constitutionality of Proposition 8 prior to the 1982 election." Most state and federal courts exercise judicial restraint when it comes to pre-election review of
initiatives, especially pre-election review on substantive rather than
procedural grounds."' Some states even forbid pre-election review of
initiatives on substantive grounds. 9
The exercise of such restraint against pre-election review is
based on the principle that an initiative is not yet within the purview
of either the executive, legislative, or judicial branches before it goes
from a mere proposal to an actual law."' A California appellate court
echoed this sentiment when it noted, "As we have frequently observed, it is usually more appropriate to review constitutional and
other challenges to ballot propositions or initiative measures after an
election rather than to disrupt the electoral process by preventing the

16. See JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE:
STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 105-06 (1989).

REFLECTIONS OF A

17. See id. at 107-09.

1& See id. at 105-06; see also Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 4, 641 P.2d 200,

201, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 101 (1982) (denying pre-election review of Proposition

8).

19. See Stan P. Geurin, Comment, Pre-ElectionJudicial Review: The Right
Choice, 17 OKLA. CTrY U. L. REV. 221, 221 n.6 (1992).
This ban on pre-election review of initiatives is not the case for all states,
however. Florida, in fact, requires substantive pre-election review of initiative
proposals.
Following a series of last-minute court challenges to a number of initiatives from 1982 through 1984, Florida voters ratified a 1986 constitutional amendment requiring state supreme court review of all initiatives which collected 10% of the requisite signatures. The 10%
threshold is designed to avoid burdening the court with frivolous initiative proposals. The state supreme court analyzes the initiative proposals for compliance with the single-subject rule and other statutory
criteria. The court then issues an advisory opinion on the measure's
validity.
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA's FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, 108-09

(1992). The court's advisory opinion is not binding, but is considered "extremely
court challenge. See id. at 109.
20. See James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-ElectionJudicialReview of Initiativesand Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 298, 311 (1989).
persuasive" in a later
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exercise of the people's franchise, in the absence of some clear
showing of invalidity."21
Where permissible,2 in order to justify pre-election review on
substantive grounds, opponents of an initiative petition must be able
to demonstrate convincingly that the measure will be invalidated and
that permitting a vote on the issue is likely to cause significant harm.'
Rationales for pre-election review have included prevention of fiscal
waste in conducting the election, federal preemption, and judicial
economy.' In California, only six initiatives and referendums have
been subjected to pre-election judicial review.' Of these, only three
initiatives have been removed from the ballot.' These include a 1983
reapportionment initiative.' a 1984 federal balanced budget amendment initiative, and a 1988 no-fault insurance reform initiative.2
21. Brosnahan,31 Cal. 3d at 4,641 P.2d at 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
22. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 20, at 302-03 (describing three cate-

gories of justifiable pre-election review).
23. See id.
24. See M. Sean Radcliffe, Comment, Pre-ElectionJudicialReview of Initiative Petitions: An UnreasonableLimitation on Political Speech, 30 TULSA L.J.
425, 430-31 (1994).
25. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 20, at 301-03.
26. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
27. The Sebastiani reapportionment initiative, as it was called prior to being
placed on the ballot, would have modified the Democratic Legislature's reapportionment plan and caused more favorable districting for state Republicans.
See Philip Hager, Remapping Vote Voided by High Court,L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 16,
1983, at Al. The California Supreme Court ruled that the initiative was unconstitutional as clearly conflicting with the state constitution. See Legislature v.
Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 680, 669 P.2d 17, 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781,794 (1983).
28. The initiative was passed on the ballot as Proposition 35, "The BalancedBudget Initiative." See Myma Oliver, Balanced-BudgetVote Killed: High Court
Removes InitiativeFrom Ballot, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1984, at Al. The Califor-

nia Supreme Court found this initiative invalid on its face because the legislature

votes on the budget, not the citizenry. See AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 694,

686 P.2d 609, 613, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93 (1984).

29. The 1988 no-fault insurance reform initiative was drafted and circulated
by groups associated with the insurance industry. The measure was a 12,000word tome that contained a hidden sentence exempting the insurance industry
from campaign contribution limits. The court disqualified the measure from the
ballot on the grounds that it obviously violated the single-subject rule. See California Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Inc. v. Eu, 200 Cal. App. 3d 351, 354-56, 245 Cal.

Rptr. 916, 917-18 (1988). Proponents removed the offending provision and recir-

culated the new version in an intense direct mail drive. After spending $2.3 million on the direct mail circulation drive, proponents were able to gather 167% of
the requisite signatures in a brief 48 days. The revised initiative survived further

judicial review and was placed on the ballot. See Insurance Indus. Initiative

Campaign Comm. v. Eu, 203 Cal. App. 3d 961, 963, 250 Cal. Rptr. 320, 321
(1988).
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More commonly, initiatives in California and other jurisdictions
are challenged after voters have approved them. Initiatives are
challenged on a wide variety of grounds. Most often, state and federal courts may invalidate an initiative for violating some constitutional principle. Less often, initiatives will be contested for conflicting with a higher federal law, known as "federal preemption."3

Courts may invalidate an initiative for addressing more than one
subjectnz or for exceeding certain subject limitations, such as highlighting a specific individual or corporation for regulation.3 Finally, a
California initiative may amend the state constitution but may not
fundamentally revise the constitutionY
In most jurisdictions, each county at the state level or each district at the federal level determines its own rules for allocating cases
among specific judges. While "judge shopping" is illegal in all jurisdictions,35 determining the court in which to file is part and parcel of a
prudent legal strategy. If prior rulings suggest that judges in one district are more hostile to an initiative than judges in another district,
filing in the more hostile district increases the odds of overturning the
initiative.
Generally, computers assign cases randomly to judges in the
county or district. There are significant exceptions, however. Senior
judges receive fewer case assignments because of their additional
administrative workload. Further, the court clerk automatically recuses judges with business or personal ties to a case. Frequently, the
assignment of emergency filings is in consecutive rather than random
30. See, e.g., Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 355, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089,
276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 338 (1990) (en bane) (concluding that California Proposition
115 violates state constitutional principles as being a revision, not an amendment); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1499-1510 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (concluding that California's Proposition 209 violates federal equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment), rev'd, 122 F.3d at 709.

31. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1511-20 (concluding that

Proposition 209 is preempted by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), rev'd,

122 F.3d at 710.
32. See, e.g., Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799

S.W.2d 824 (Mo. 1990) (en banc); In re Initiative Petition No. 314, 625 P.2d 595
(Okla. 1980).
33. See, e.g., Pala Band of Mission Indians v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal.
App. 4th 565, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148 (1997); Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48
Cal. 3d 805,771 P.2d 1247,258 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989).
34. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 2-3; Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 506,

816 P.2d 1309, 1316,286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 290 (1991).
35. See, e.g., Cal. R. U.S.D.C.N.D. Civ. L.R. 3-3(c); La. R. 18th Dist. Ct. R. 9;
Ohio Sup. R. 36 commentary.
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order. Also, judges may on occasion exercise some discretion in consolidating multiple filings on the same initiative by assigning them to
a particular judge with special expertise in the field.
For example, in California, opponents of a 1996 campaign reform measure, Proposition 208, filed five separate actions, all in the
United States District Court, Eastern District of California." The
district has eight judges in all, two of them senior judges with limited
caseloads. Not coincidentally, the federal judge serving the district
had previously voided campaign finance legislation and an earlier
state campaign finance reform initiative-Proposition 73.' The five
actions were distributed randomly among the judges but then consolidated in one court. The guiding principle for consolidation in
this district was that the judge who receives the lowest case number,
or first filing, of these five actions, or of a related case, receives the
consolidated actions. A "related case" could include a prior case
dealing with a similar subject, and the prior case would then become
the lowest case number. Consequently, this consolidation process
transformed all five actions against Proposition 208 into one case to
be heard by the same judge who had previously invalidated Proposition 73.39 In a decision that both proponents and opponents of
Proposition 208 alike expected, this federal district judge ruled
against the measure.' °
II. SHOULD THERE BE A STRICTER STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR
INITIATIVES?

Despite the apparent contradiction between the "republican
form of government" guaranteed in the United States Constitution4 1
and "direct democracy" embodied by initiatives, the U.S. Supreme

Court in 1912 found that the initiative process itself was not at odds

36. See John Jacobs, Courts Speed Up Hearingson Props,SAN DIEGO UNION
TRiB., May 31, 1997, at B6; Dan Bernstein, Prop. 208 Has Some Dazed, Confused, Exaggerating,SACRAMENTo BEE, June 15,1997, at Al.

37. See Service Employees Int'l Union v. FPPC, 721 F. Supp. 1172 (E.D. Cal.
1989) (Karlton, C.J., holding that law prohibiting candidates from expending car-

ryover funds in campaigns for elective office violated First Amendment).
38. See supranote 36, at Al.
39. See Carl Ingram & Max Vanzi, Lawyers FinishArguments on Proposition
208, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at A3.

40. See California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No. CIV.

S-96-1965LKKDAD, 1998 WL 7173, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998). The case is
on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
41. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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with the form of governance established under the Federal Constitution.42 In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,43 the
high court ruled that the initiative process was simply an additional
form of government that complements rather than contradicts the
federal form of government and representative democracy. Since
that ruling, courts have not questioned the underlying legitimacy of
the initiative process.
Instead, judicial attention has focused on the appropriate standard of review for assessing the constitutionality of individual initiatives. The courts have generally operated under the presumption
that both legislation and initiatives are subject to similar standards of
review and constitutional scrutiny. 4 Chief Justice Burger clearly expressed this viewpoint in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley" when he said, "It is irrelevant that the voters rather than a
legislative body enacted [this law] because the voters may no more
violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot46 measure than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation.,
Nevertheless, the debate over the appropriate standard of review
for initiatives continues to rage, especially in academic circles. Some
legal scholars have argued that initiatives require even stricter standards of scrutiny than those applicable to representative legislation.47
They base their argument on several premises. First, academics argue that initiatives, as a tool of majoritarian democracy, disproportionately attack the civil liberties of minorities. 48 To illustrate, initiatives have on occasion been used to undermine the rights of ethnic
minorities,49 gays and lesbians,' immigrants,5 ' and other minorities.?
42. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
43. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).

44. See, e.g., Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly v. Lucas, 379 U.S. 693 (1965); Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669
P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
45. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
46. Id. at 295.
47. See Julian N. Eule, JudicialReview of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.

1503, 1558 (1990).
48. See William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative Challenges: Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny, and Direct Democracy, 55 OHIo ST. L.J. 583, 628 (1994).
49. See Proposition 14 (Rumford Fair Housing Initiative) in CALIFORNIA
BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION 13-14, 18-20 (Nov. 3, 1964).
50. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
51. See Proposition 187, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL
ELECTION 50-55 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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Accordingly, academics often contend that initiatives require stricter
review for the protection of civil liberties.'
While there are certainly valid examples of initiative legislation
that have threatened civil liberties, no one can claim that this is
solely, or even disproportionately, the purview of initiative legislation. The story of American governance is fraught with examples of
legislation by representative bodies that has violated the civil liberties
of minorities. The internment of Japanese-Americans during World
War II,' segregation and poll taxes,.5 racial gerrymandering,56 and obscenity laws' are just a few examples of such legislation. Legislative
bodies have also enacted many of the anti-gay, anti-immigrant and
anti-crime proposals ascribed to initiatives. 8 The principle that both
initiatives and representative legislation should be subject to equal
standards of judicial review is not lost on those interested in protection of civil liberties.
A second argument frequently voiced for a stricter standard of
scrutiny on initiative legislation is that initiatives are not drafted with
the same deliberateness as legislation from representative bodies. 9
Initiatives are frequently written by a group of similarly-minded individuals. As the product of subgroups, initiatives can lack the input
of opposing viewpoints and the scrutiny of other experts in the field
and thus contain oversights and unintended consequences. In California, for example, one group drafted and sponsored a campaign finance reform measure, Proposition 212, which accidentally would
have deleted the state's major ethics laws.6
52. See Proposition 209, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL
ELECION 30-33 (Nov. 5, 1996).
53. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 48, at 623-24; Eule, supra note 47, at 1525,

1545.
54. Exec. Order No. 9,066,3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943).
55. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer
v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,282 F. Supp. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
56. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Hays v. State of La., 839 F.

Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993).
57. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518

U.S. 727 (1996); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
5& See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (addressing Congress's anti-crime statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922,
which controls the presence of guns in school zones); Flores-Arellano v. INS, 5
F.3d 360 (9th Cir. 1993) (interpreting the meaning of federal immigration statute

8 U.S.C. § 1257).
59. See Eule, supranote 47, at 1555-56.

60. See Mark Gladstone, Battle Over CampaignReform Goes to Court,L.A.
TIMES, July 25, 1996, at A3.
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This problem, however, is not unique to initiatives. Legislation
drafted in representative bodies is, in fact, routinely drafted by special-interest groups and their lobbyists, not necessarily with an eye
for the welfare of the general public. A classic example is California's insurance law6 prior to being changed by an initiative. 2 In the
late 1980s, Assembly Speaker Willie Brown sat down at Frank Fat's
restaurant in Sacramento with insurance industry lobbyists and trial
lawyers. 3 He negotiated an agreement, written on a cocktail napkin,
in which the insurance industry obtained an insurance law with no
controls on prices and the trial lawyers were rewarded no control on
lawyers' fees and damage awards.' All interests were considered except those of California's consumers, who subsequently revolted and
rewrote the state's insurance policy by initiative and placed controls
on insurance costs. 6
More recently, the California legislature approved a bold antismoking law.' This law prohibits smoking in almost all public places,
including bars, in order to protect the health of employees. ' But the
legislature neglected to clarify issues of enforcement. Bar owners are
supposed to take "reasonable steps" to enforce the ban,6 but no one
is sure what that means. The law delegates enforcement to the cities
and counties, with no clear division of authority. In some instances,
a county has the authority either to require bars to post no-smoking
signs but no authority to prosecute within certain cities or to make

61. See Stephen D. Sugarman, California'sInsurance Regulation Resolution:

The First Two Years of Proposition103, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 683,714 (1990).
62. See Proposition 103, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL

ELECIION 98-101, 140-44 (Nov. 8, 1988).
63. See Paul F. Arentz, Defining "ProfessionalNegligence" After Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic v. Superior Court: Should California'sMedical

Injury Compensation Reform Act Cover Intentional Torts? 30 CAL. W. L. REV.
221, 263 n.24 (1994).

64. See Daniel M. Weintraub, Lobbyists, Lawyers Cut Deal in Injury Liability, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 12, 1987, at Al.
65. The cocktail napkin on which Willie Brown wrote his agreement has since
been framed and is currently hanging on the wall of Frank Fat's in Sacramento.
66. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5 (West 1989 & West Supp. 1998); see also
Dan Morain, Smoke Set to Clear in Bars-But Will It?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22,
1997, at Al (discussing impact of § 6404.5).
67. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5(a).

68. See id. § 6404.5(c).
69. See id. § 6404.5(j).
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city officials prosecute violations.'0 This situation has led to inconsistent enforcement of the law throughout the state."
The election process itself provides the greatest safeguard
against poorly drafted initiatives: through the course of a campaign,
debate usually points out and even exaggerates flaws in initiatives,
and voters tend to react accordingly. Voters tend to be very cautious
and thus are reluctant to approve initiatives at the ballot box. Hisrate.
torically, California's initiatives average a one-third approval
This reluctance dramatically increases when voters are uncertain
about a measure. When uncertain, the voter generally casts a vote
against an initiative in order to maintain the existing public order."
Because of uncertainty, voters rejected Proposition 212, which inadvertently would have deleted California's ethics laws.
The problems that plague the initiative process also plague the
legislative process. Both processes produce laws which tread on civil
liberties, and both produce laws which restore civil liberties. Both
produce laws with unintended consequences, and both produce laws
to correct inadequate public policies.
Strictly from the perspective of policy outputs, both initiatives
and legislation from representative bodies must be subject to judicial
review to ensure sufficient and adequate safeguards. Still, there exists in fact an important difference in standards of review for initiative legislation. The distinction is not in the different treatment of
initiatives and legislation, however, but in the different approaches
taken by the state and federal courts when reviewing initiatives. The
state and federal courts apply different standards of judicial scrutiny
to initiatives. This practice is beginning to turn the judicial system
into an unwitting player in the politics of direct democracy.

§§ 6404.5(c) & (i).
70. See id.
71. See Jeff Leeds, Bar Patrons Still Smoke Despite Ban, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15,
1998, at B1.
72. See Robyn R. Polashuk, Protectingthe PublicDebate: The Validity of the
FairnessDoctrine in Ballot Initiative Elections, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 391, 402-03

(1993) (citing

CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING,

MOCRACY BY INrIATIvE:

SHAPING CALIFORNIA'S

DE-

FOURTH BRANCH OF

367 (1992)).
73. See Polashuk, supranote 72, at 403 (discussing that voters frequently shift
their positions on initiatives during the campaign, typically ending in opposition).
GOVERNMENT
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IMl. CALIFORNIA STATE COURTS SHOW SOME DEFERENCE TO

INITIATIVES
Although the principle of judicial review of ballot initiatives appears firmly entrenched, courts in some states, including California,
express considerable deference to initiatives and have shown a reluctance to overturn them in their entirety.74 At one time, Colorado's
Constitution forbade pre-election and post-election judicial review of
initiatives."' The language of Nevada's Constitution provides a three
year moratorium on legislative review of initiatives although Nevada's state courts do not consider themselves bound by this prohibition. 76
Traditionally, California's state courts have treated direct democracy with considerable respect. This feeling was articulated in a
1978 California Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality of Proposition 13, which addressed tax relief: "It is our solemn
duty to 'jealously guard' the initiative process, it being 'one of the
precious rights of our democratic process."" State courts have followed this principle on several other occasions. 8
Nevertheless, the state courts' respect for the initiative process
has not meant that courts have shied away from judicial review of
initiatives. California's state courts have reviewed a number of initiatives for constitutionality. 9 From 1964 to the 1990 primary
74. See Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 683, 669 P.2d 17, 35, 194

Cal. Rptr. 781, 799 (1993) (Richardson, J., dissenting) (noting the special and favored treatment of initiatives when reviewed by the court).
75. See COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (repealed1966).
76. See NEv. CONST. art. XIX, § 2; Nevada Judges Ass'n v. Lau, 910 P.2d 898
(Nev. 1996) (reviewing a term limits initiative for state and federal constitutional
violations); Choose Life Campaign '90' v. Del Papa, 801 P.2d 1384, 1386-87 (Nev.
1990) (holding that arguments drafted by the Secretary of State for and against a
referendum were false and misleading); Torvinen v. Rollins, 560 P.2d 915, 917
(Nev. 1977) (holding amendment to be effective on date votes for amendment
were canvassed).
77. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal. 3d 208, 248, 548 P.2d 1281, 1302, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 259 (1978) (quoting
Associates Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d
473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976).
78. See, e.g., City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 648
P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1982); Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n v.
Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197, 643 P.2d 941, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1982); Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 616 P.2d 802, 167 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1980).
79. See Doug Willis, Get Ready for Another Wild Election Year in 1998, THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS POLITICAL SERvICE, Sept. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL
2552458. "In the past decade, more than 300 petition drives for initiatives have
been started, with only 85 collecting enough signatures to go on the ballot. But
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election, 79 initiatives have qualified for the state ballot." Of these
balloted initiatives, 21 have encountered either pre-election or post-

election challenges in state or federal court.81 The courts, however,

have upheld slightly less than half of these initiatives-only 10either substantially or in their entirety.'
Most of these contested initiatives and citizen-initiated referendums from 1964 to 1990 were challenged in the state courts.8 Only
one such challenge was originally filed in the federal court system;
two other challenges went through the state courts and were ap-

pealed to the federal court system.? Eighteen, or 86%, of the 21
challenged initiatives and referendums were decided at the state
court level. 6
From 1964 through 1990, the state courts were willing to exercise
their authority to overturn or substantially modify initiatives and referendums, upholding or substantially upholding 56% and invalidating
or substantially invalidating 44% of the 18 challenges heard at the
state level.' But the state courts have completely invalidated only 6
initiatives over this 25 year time period." During the last 15 years of
this period, from 1974 to 1990, the state courts were been particularly
hesitant to invalidate initiatives. Only 3 of the 29 initiatives approved
voters defeated 61 of those initiatives, and among the 24 they approved, part or
all of 16 were overturned in court." Id.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
See infraTable 1.

88. See, e.g., Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 411 P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537
(1966) (holding that Proposition 15-the Free Television Act, prohibiting pay
television in the home-abridged state and federal free speech guarantees);
Kopp v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 11 Cal. 4th 607, 905 P.2d 1248, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 108 (1991) (holding that judicial review of Proposition 68, which limited
campaign contributions, could not save unconstitutional initiative); Chemical
Specialties Mfg. Ass'n v. Deukmejian, 227 Cal. App. 3d 663, 278 Cal. Rptr. 128
(1991)(holding that Proposition 105-the Public's Right to Know Act-was invalid because it violated the single subject rule); Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34
Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983) (holding that Sebastiani Redistricting Initiative was precluded by constitutional provision limiting redistricting
to once per 10-year period); California Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. Eu, 200 Cal. App.
3d 351, 245 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1988) (holding that No Fault Insurance Initiative violated single subject rule); American Fed'n of Labor-Congress of Indus. Org. v.
Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984) (holding Balanced
Budget Taxpayer Initiative, directing or requesting Congress to request a Constitutional Convention, but which did not enact legislation of any kind, was invalid).

1252

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:1239

TABLE I
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES
1964 THROUGH 1990 PRIMARY ELECTIONS

Titled Initiatives, 1964- 1990 Primary

476

Qualified Initiatives
Percentage Qualified

79
17%

Approved Initiatives
Percentage Approved

34
44%

Contested Initiatives
Percentage Contested of Balloted Initiatives

21
27%

Contested Initiatives Upheld
Percentage Contested Upheld

10
48%

Reviewed by State Courts
Percentage Reviewed by State Courts
Upheld by State Courts
Percentage Upheld by State Courts

18
86%
10
56%

Reviewed by State/Federal Courts
Percentage reviewed by State/Federal Courts
Upheld by State/Federal Courts
Percentage Upheld by State/Federal Courts

2
9%
0
0%

Reviewed by Federal Courts
Percentage Reviewed by Federal Courts
Upheld by Federal Courts
Percentage Upheld by Federal Courts

1
5%
0
0%

June 1998] JUDICIAL REVIEW OFBALLOT INITIATIVES

1253

by voters during that time were invalidated in their entirety: Propo-

sition 6 regarding inheritance tax; Proposition 68, campaign finance;
and Proposition 105, disclosure.'

Although they reviewed a smaller number of cases, the federal
courts have not shown any similar deference to initiatives during the
same period. Of the 3 challenged initiatives that originated or ended

up in the federal court system, none were upheldY Proposition 14,
addressing fair housing, and Proposition 73, campaign finance, were
entirely or substantially invalidated by the federal courts,9' and a bal-

anced budget initiative was removed from the ballot in a pre-election
challenge.'
IV. FEDERAL COURTS APPEAR MORE WILLING TO INVALIDATE
INITIATIVES
While California's state courts have shown some deference to
initiatives, the federal courts have not been perceived as showing a
similar reluctance to review and invalidate initiatives. It is not at all
clear at this point whether this perception is valid. Nevertheless, an
entirely new pattern of judicial review of initiatives is emerging from
the federal courts.
Perhaps unwittingly, the federal courts have become key players
in California's initiative process. The willingness of the federal courts
to invalidate initiatives prior to 1990,"3 bolstered by a growing understanding within the legal community of the differences in judicial culture between an elective state judiciary and an appointed federal judiciary, has caused opponents of initiatives to increasingly take their

89. See, e.g., Estate of Cirone 153 Cal. App. 3d 199, 200 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1984)
(invalidating Proposition 6); Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 212 Cal. App. 3d 991, 260 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1989)
(invalidating Proposition 68); Chemical Specialties,227 Cal. App. 3d 663, 278 Cal.
Rptr. 128 (invalidating Proposition 105).
90. See infra Appendix A.
91. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (holding that Proposition 14,
which amended the California Constitution so as to prohibit the state from denying residents the right to decline to sell, lease or rent property to any person
within their absolute discretion, impermissibly involved the state in private racial
discriminations); Service Employees Int'l Union v. Fair Political Practices
Comm'n, 955 F.2d 1312 (1992) (holding that Proposition 73, governing candidates' fiscal spending, was unconstitutional).
92. See supraTable 1.
93. See infra Table 1.
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TABLE 2

CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES

1990 THROUGH 1996 GENERAL ELECTIONS

Titled Initiatives, 1990 - 1996 General

199

Qualified Initiatives
Percentage Qualified

44
22%

Approved Initiatives
Percentage Approved

15
34%

Contested Initiatives
Percentage Contested of Balloted Initiatives

9
21%

Contested Initiatives Upheld
Percentage Contested Upheld

4
44%

Reviewed by State Courts
Percentage Reviewed by State Courts
Upheld by State Courts
Percentage Upheld by State Courts

2
22%
2
100%

Reviewed by State/Federal Courts
Percentage reviewed by State/Federal Courts
Upheld by State/Federal Courts
Percentage Upheld by State/Federal Courts

2
22%
1
50%

Reviewed by Federal Courts
Percentage Reviewed by Federal Courts
Upheld by Federal Courts
Percentage Upheld by Federal Courts

5
56%
2
40%
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FIGURE 1
COURT JURISDIcTION OF CONTESTED INITIATIVES:

1964 - 1990 PRIMARY V. 1990 - 1996 GENERAL
1964 - 1990 PRIMARY

State Courts
Federal
Courts
State/Federal
Courts

1990 - 1996 PRIMARY

State Courts
Federal
Courts

/

State/Federal
Courts
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case to federal rather than state court.94 The dramatic shift in filing
challenges to California's initiatives in federal rather than state court
began with the 1990 general election. Since then, opponents of initiatives in California have consistently filed in the federal courts.
As shown in Figure 1, the pattern of challenging initiatives has
dramatically and overwhelmingly shifted between the time periods of
1964 through the 1990 primary election and the 1990 general election
to present. While state courts reviewed 86% of all contested initiatives from 1964 to 1990,9" they reviewed only 22% from 1990 to
1996.9 The federal courts have clearly become the preferred venue
for these challenges. While only 5% of challenged initiatives were
filed with the federal courts from 1964 to 1990, 56% of all challenges
were filed with the federal courts from 1990 to 1996.' The role of the
federal courts in the initiative process appears even greater when
looking at the number of initiatives that currently end up in the federal courts, regardless of where the challenges were originally filed.
An overwhelming 78% of all challenges to California's initiatives
since the general election of 1990 have ended up in the federal courts
for a final decision, compared to 14% in the previous 26 years."
This change is not due to federal judges' stepping into the fray
but due to the fact that opponents of initiatives have generally bypassed the state court system and filed their challenges directly in
federal district court. A new, aggressive attitude has developed
among those who campaign against initiatives to continue the fight by
other means-federal litigation.
Federal litigation is thus fast becoming another step in an opposition campaign strategy. If opponents fail to defeat an initiative at
the ballot box, a portion of the campaign budget is routinely set aside

94. See, e.g., Walton v. Walton, 31 Cal. App. 4th 277, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901

(1995) (discussing Proposition 164); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing Proposition 187); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288 (E.D Cal. 1997) (discussing Proposition

198); California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No. CIV. S-961965LKKDAD, 1998 WL 7173 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998) (discussing Proposition
208); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(discussing Proposition 209); People v. Trippet, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1532, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 559 (1997) (discussing Proposition 215).

95.
96.
97.
98.

See supraTable 1.
See supraTable 2.
See supraTables 1 & 2.
See supraTables 1 & 2.
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FIGURE 2
PERCENTAGE OF VOTER-APPROVED INITIATIVES
CHALLENGED IN COURT:
1964 - 1990 PRIMARY V. 1990 - 1996 GENERAL

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
1964-1990

1990-1996

1257

1258

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1239

to contest the initiative in federal court." Consequently, there has
been a modest but significant increase in the likelihood that an initiative approved by the voters will be litigated. Given the large increase in balloted initiatives in the 1990s, the percentage of contested
initiatives of all balloted initiatives before and after 1990 are comparable. However, when looking at those initiatives that have been approved by voters, 60% of all voter-approved initiatives have faced
litigation since the 1990 general election, compared to 53% prior."°
There is some indication that this strategy may be paying off
for opponents of initiatives. Challenging initiatives in the state court
system traditionally has been a 50-50 proposition given state judges'
deference to initiatives. But the federal court system-with its lifetime appointive system for judges-offers an entirely different outlook for the survival of initiatives.
Once again, the number of cases is small; but a pattern of judicial
decision-making is becoming apparent. As shown in Table 2, both
initiatives filed and decided in state courts since 1990-Proposition
184, "Three Strikes," and Proposition 213, which excludes drunk
drivers and uninsured motorists from seeking non-economic damages
in suits-have been entirely or substantially upheld."' Five initiatives
have been challenged in the federal courts since 1990, with only two
being upheld thus far. That means about three-fifths of initiatives
filed in the federal court system have been entirely or substantially
invalidated to date. This pattern stands in sharp contrast to the state
court system, which has not invalidated any initiative since the 1990
general election.
A word of caution about these figures needs to be pointed out,
however. Unlike the data for the period prior to the 1990 general
election, in which all the cases have been decided, many of the initiatives challenged since 1990 are still pending or on appeal.' 2 Although
opponents evidently believe their chances of overturning voterapproved initiatives are better in the federal courts than the state
courts-and the early results suggest they may be correct-it is

99. See Charles M. Price, Shadow Government,CAL. J., Oct. 1997, at 32-33.
100. See infraFigure 2.

101. See Yoshioka v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 4th 972, 986, 993, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 553, 560, 564 (1997) (holding that Proposition 213 did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution or the single subject requirement of the California Constitution).
102. See Appendix B at 53.
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uncertain whether the appellate courts in the federal system will follow suit.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

The difference in the way state courts and federal courts treat
initiatives is largely attributable to the different judicial cultures
arising from their respective judicial selection processes. Most state
judges, including those in California, are elected to office, a process
which emphasizes judicial accountability to the public. Federal
judges, however, are appointed for life and may be removed only
through impeachment, which emphasizes judicial independence from
the public.' Regardless of the relative merit of accountability versus
independence, the difference in emphasis is likely to influence the
court's willingness to void all or part of an initiative.
Associate Justice Otto Kaus, who served on the California Supreme Court from 1980 through 1985, described the different judicial
cultures between an elective system and an appointive system with a
metaphor. °4 Justice Kaus said that reviewing the constitutionality of
an initiative when facing reelection is like finding a crocodile in your
bathtub in the morning.0 5 You try not to think about the crocodile,
but you know it is there, and it is hard to think of much else while
shaving.1 ' 6
103. See

CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, THE PRICE OF

JUSTICE 74 (1995). Competitive elections clearly are the most common method

of judicial selection with 29 states primarily using election contests to select
judges. Twelve of these states conduct their competitive judicial elections on
partisan ballots. Several states also employ partisan ballots for noncompetitive
retention elections. The remaining 17 states that primarily select their judges
through competitive elections place the contests on nonpartisan ballots.
Ten states use the retention election process for selecting most judges. Not
all retention systems are the same. Several retention election systems, such as
California's method of selecting appellate judges, do not include a merit selection
process.
Eleven states, plus the District of Columbia, primarily employ an appointment method of judicial selection among most of their jurisdiction's courts. The
appointing authority ranges from both houses of the legislature in South Carolina
and Virginia-Rhode Island for Supreme Court only-to the U.S. Senate in the
District of Columbia. Most states, however, vest this responsibility with the governor. See id.; JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A
STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 3-4 (1989).
104. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of JudicialPoliticization,72 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1133, 1133 (1997).

105. See id.
106. See id.
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While no self-respecting judge would sacrifice constitutional
principles in the face of reelection opportunities, the point that can
be drawn from Justice Kaus is that an elective system does somewhat
increase judicial accountability. For example, in a recent decision
upholding Proposition 140 on term limits, the California Supreme
Court opined that
[a]lthough the legislative power under our state Constitution is
vested in the Legislature, "the people reserve to themselves the
powers of initiative and referendum." Accordingly, the initiative power must be liberally construed to promote the democratic process. Indeed, it is our solemn duty to jealously guard
the precious initiative power, and to resolve any reasonable
doubts in favor of its exercise.107
However, this has not meant that state courts are insensitive to
constitutional issues when it comes to reviewing initiatives. As
shown above, the state courts have been reluctant to overturn entire
initiatives."' Rather, the state courts have frequently used a scalpel
to sever the offending sections of initiatives.' 9 Proposition 140, for
example, was left mostly intact; but the court did remove the initiative's retroactive sanction against legislative pensions.110 A section of
Proposition 115-addressing victim's rights-was removed because
the court felt it impinged on federal authority, though the initiative
itself was substantially upheld."' More recently, the California Supreme Court modified Proposition 184 to give trial judges the same
strike prior felony convictions as is given to district attorright11to
2
neys.
Conversely, in an appointive judicial selection system, lifetenured judges remain comfortably aloof of the public's will. From
this difference in judicial selection procedure stems a difference in
judicial culture between the state and federal courts. Although this
difference should not be overstated, opponents of initiatives have
realized the difference in judicial cultures and have incorporated the
107. Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 500-01, 816 P.2d 1309, 1312-13, 286 Cal.

Rptr. 283,286-87 (1991) (quoting CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1) (citations omitted).

10& See supraPart III.
109. See Price, supranote 95, at 37.
110. See Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283

(1991).
111. See Izazaga v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal. 3d 356, 815 P.2d 304, 285 Cal. Rptr.
231 (1991); Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 355-56, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089-90,
276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 338-39 (1990); Price, supra note 95, at 37.
112. See Price, supranote 95, at 37.
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use of federal courts as part of a comprehensive opposition campaign
strategy.
In recent years, Congress has considered proposals for moderating federal court authority to overturn state initiatives."' Regardless
of the merits of some of the provisions of these bills, they have thus
far been presented as an ideological attack on "liberal judges" of the
federal courts, resulting in the alienation of many Democratic congressional members. 4 Ironically, some of the initiatives that federal
judges temporarily enjoined, such as an initiative eliminating affirmative action, have since been upheld. In an unusually sharp
personal attack on the federal district judge who struck down the
measure, a three-judge appellate panel wrote: "A system which permits one judge to block with a stroke of the pen what 4,736,180
[actually, 5,268,462] state residents voted to enact as law tests the integrity of our constitutional democracy."' 5
Although these bills have contained several provisions, the key
element of each bill is a proposal that all federal challenges to state
initiatives be heard first by a three-judge federal panel." This proposal follows a long tradition of federal judicial practice."7
From 1910 through 1976, a federal statute required a three-judge
panel to address any suit seeking an injunction against implementation of a legislative statute on grounds of federal constitutional issues. 18 The federal statute'was amended in 1976, leaving the threejudge panel requirement to apply only in two types of cases: suits involving apportionment of congressional and legislative districts and
suits otherwise required to be heard by a three-judge panel,"9 such as
those filed under the Voting Rights Act of 1965.'2 Congress eased
113.
114.
115.
1977).
116.
Other

See H.R. 1170, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1997).
The primary bills are HR 1170 and HR 1252. See supra note 109.
Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir.
See H.R 1252, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing a three judge requirement).
provisions of HR 1170 include: granting courts of appeals discretion to

allow interlocutory appeals from district court orders that determine whether an
action may be maintained as a class action; limiting the power of the federal judiciary to impose new taxes on states; and permitting proponents and opponents
one opportunity to reassign the case to another judge:

117. See Bruce L. Moyer, Judge's Pay Delinkage & COLA Relief Near Pas-

sage, 44 FED. LAw. 8, 9 (Oct. 1997).
118. See Act of"Mar. 4, 1913, Pub. L. No. 62-445, 37 Stat. 1013 (codified as

amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1994)).
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).
120. See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c)
(1994)).
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the requirement that a three-judge panel hear all contested state
statutes because of the burden it had placed on the federal court
system.
Requiring a panel of three district court judges to hear challenges to state initiatives would not impose a similar burden on federal courts. At most, about a dozen or so state initiatives might be
challenged in federal court each election year. m This would not constitute an overly burdensome caseload.
While the costs to the federal judiciary would be negligible, the
benefits are potentially significant. Citizens are likely to feel more
concerned and involved with legislation emerging from the initiative
process than with the remote legislation produced by legislatures.
When federal judges strike down initiatives, voters frequently react
with hostility toward the judiciary and conclude that the personal
prejudices of one judge have been unfairly imposed upon an entire
state.2' This attitude is reflected in a growing distrust of both the judiciary-at both the state and federal levels-and the initiative process itself.'U
For example, California Supreme Court justices had been readily
confirmed in judicial retention elections throughout the state's history.'2 Since the 1986 voter revolt against Chief Justice Bird and
three other colleagues who undercut much of the death penalty initiative," most justices have received an average 40% "no" vote in retention elections. m Once a highly esteemed governmental body, the
courts-state and federal alike-are beginning to lose some of the
public's confidence. Striking down popular initiatives has likely contributed to this loss in confidence.
At the same time, voters in California are growing increasingly
frustrated with the initiative process. Surveys show that while overwhelming majorities of Californians want to preserve the right of initiative, they also want some reforms of the process."' Some 74% of
respondents believe that the initiative process is generally a good
121.
91.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See S. Rep. No. 94-204, at 3-4, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1988, 1990-

See infranotes 121-22 and accompanying appendices.
See Prince,supranote 95, at 38.
See id.
See id.See id.
See id.
See John Jacobs, Polk Voters Like Initiative Process, But Want it Fixed,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 9,1997, at B7.
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thing, but almost as many respondents want to see some changes to
it.'29 One of the most popular proposals for change is to restrict court
invalidation of initiatives.'
For the reason of public alienation alone, it is appropriate to
provide special safeguards for federal judicial review of state initiatives. The modest proposal of requiring a hearing by a panel of three
district judges could go a long way toward assuaging the public's disenchantment with the judiciary and the initiative process. Determinations by a three-judge panel are more likely to be deliberative and
fair, overcoming the particular biases of a single judge, and are likely
to be seen as such by the public.
VI. CONCLUSION: PROMOTE DELIBERATENESS IN JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS

Judicial intervention in the legislative process, including legislation by initiative, is and must continue to be a hallowed principle of
American governance. It is designed, in part, to protect civil liberties
against the potential excesses of majoritarian democracy. Legislation
by initiative is majoritarian democracy in its purest sense and clearly
must be subject to judicial review.
When the courts invalidate initiatives, however, the ramifications are far greater than court invalidation of most other legislation.
Initiatives usually address issues of deep concern to the populace, and
voters feel a stake in initiative legislation unlike that felt for legislative acts. Court invalidation of initiatives has caused the beginnings
of a voter backlash-both against the initiative process and the judicial system. Surveys support the fact that voters in California are
losing faith in legislation by initiative. The refrain "why should I vote
for the initiative when the courts will just throw it out" is increasingly
heard. At the same time, voters are losing confidence in the judiciary-a branch of government that has historically been held in high
esteem. The judicial system was especially cast in a poor light when
Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit invalidated Proposition 140 on state term limits, claiming that voters did not understand
the initiative1'
129. See id
130. See id
131. See Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Bates

v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Judge Reinhardt represented a
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Following Reinhardt's

ruling that voters had been ignorant of a provision calling for the lifetime ban on
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Perhaps even more alarming for the integrity of the judiciary is
the dramatic transformation of the role of the federal courts in direct
democracy. Once an occasional arbiter of civil rights, the federal
courts have recently become part and parcel of an overall opposition
campaign strategy. Opponents of initiatives have come to realize
that different judicial selection processes have created different judicial cultures between the state and federal courts-with the federal
courts less inclined to defer to initiatives. As a result, opposition
campaigns in California are now more likely to challenge initiatives
in federal court and to bypass the state court system altogether. In
essence, federal district judges are being integrated into the politics
of initiative campaigns.
Perhaps this "politicization" of the federal judiciary cannot be
avoided, but the process by which the courts review the-constitutionality of initiatives must be fair and balanced and perceived as
such. A simple step of returning to the time-honored legal tradition
of hearing challenges to state laws-in this case initiatives-before a
panel of three federal district court judges would encourage greater
deliberateness in the process of judicial review and would strengthen
the legitimacy of the judges' decisions.

officials holding the same office after a given term, an 11-judge en banc panel of
the same court reversed the three-judge panel decision by a nine-to-two vote.

See Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3492
(U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-1173). Judge David Thompson, who wrote the majority opinion for the en banc panel, noted that extensive media coverage, oppo-

sition campaign literature warning of the lifetime ban, and voter rejection of a

more limited term limits proposal on the same ballot made it clear voters knew
what they were doing. See id. at 846.
While agreeing with Thompson on the result, three judges argued that
Thompson went too far by deciding on the merits of the case. Judges Schroeder,
Rymer and O'Scannlain lamented that the California Supreme Court should

have had the last word on the issue when it upheld the initiative six years earlier.
See id. at 858 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
In a sarcastic note, Judge O'Scannlain wrote: "Searching the Constitution,
I am unable to locate an 'ignorant voter clause' that vests federal courts with the

power to review voter-enacted legislation to ensure that enough people were capable of understanding what they had voted for...." Id. at 853 (O'Scannlain, J.,
concurring).
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APPENDIX A
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES CHALLENGED IN STATE AND FEDERAL

COURTS: 1964 THROUGH 1990 PRIMARY ELECIiON
YEAR

PRPOP.
NUMBER

1964
1964

DESCRIPTION

PRE OR POST
ELEC. Rnv.

RESULT

14

Fair housing

Post-Election

Invalidated

15

Pay television

Post-Election

Invalidated

x

1972

21

School busing

Post-Election Substantially
Invalidated

x

1974

9

Political reform

Post-Election Substantially
Upheld

x

1978

7

Death penalty

Post-Election

x

1978

13

1980

10

Reapportionment Pre-Election

1980

11

Reapportionment Pre-Election

1980

12

Reapportionment Pre-Election

1982
6
1983 Removed

Property taxes

Inheritance tax
Sebastiani
I reapportionment

Substantially
Upheld
Post-Election
Upheld

Post-Election
Pre-Election

LEVEL OF COURT
State State/Fed. Federal
X

x

Substantially
Upheld
Substantially
Upheld
Substantially
Upheld

x

Invalidated
Invalidated

x
x

x
x

1984

24

Legislative reform Post-Election Substantially
I _Invalidated
1984 Removed Balanced budget Pre-Election
Invalidated

x

1986

62

Taxation

x

Post-Election

Substantially
Upheld

x

1988 Removed No-fault insurance Pre-Election
1988
68
Campaign finance Post-Election
1988
73
Campaign finance Post-Election

Invalidated
Invalidated
Invalidated

x
x

Upheld

x

1988

96

1988

103

1988
June
1990

105
115

AIDS testing

Post-Election

Insurance reform Post-Election Substantially
I____I_
Upheld
Disclosure
Post-Election Invalidated
Victims' rights Post-Election Substantially
Upheld

x
x
x
x
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APPENDIX B

CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES CHALLENGED IN STATE AND FEDERAL

COURTS: 1990 THROUGH 1996 GENERAL ELECTION
YEAR PRPOP.

DESCRIPTION

NUMBER

Nov.

PRE OR POST

RESULT

ELEc. REV.

140

Term limits

LEVEL OF COURT
State State/Fed. Federal

Post-Election

Substantially

1990

x

upheld

1992

164

Congressional term Post-Election

Invalidated

x

limits

1994

184

Three strikes

Post-Election

Substantially

x

upheld

1994

187

Immigration

Post-Election

Substantially

x

invalidated,
appealed

1996

198

Open primary

Post-Election

Upheld,
appealed

1996

208

Campaign finance

Post-Election

x
I

Invalidated,

x

appealed

1966

209

Affirmative action

1996

213

Drunk driver suits Post-Election

Post-Election

Upheld

upheld

1996

215
I

Marijuana
_ I_

Post-Election
_

x

Substantially
Substantially
I

upheld

x
III

x

